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BOOK REVIEWS
Political Theory
Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and
Professional Life. By Arthur Isak Applbaum. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 288p. $29.95.

Dan Sabia, Universityof South Carolina
Impressive substantive knowledge, analytical rigor, and Kantian and liberal democratic commitments are all in play in
this careful exploration of the morality of roles in adversary
institutions. Extending the concept from its usual location in
accounts of legal, especially criminal, representation in the
American legal system, adversary institutions and professions
are conceived as practices in which role players like business
executives, lawyers, public officials and bureaucrats adopt
partisan and limited, and therefore often conflicting, perspectives and interests, and claim the right to intentionally harm
others, on the ground that such partiality, conflict, and
conduct will help promote or secure valued outcomes or
goods such as prosperity, justice, and legitimate government.
The "central question" addressed in the book is how acting
in an adversary institution and role can morally justify or
"morally permit actions that otherwise would be morally
wrong" (p. 10). Many common justifications are examined,
and all are found to be "weaker than [often] supposed."
Adversary "institutions and the roles they create ordinarily
cannot mint moral permissions to do what otherwise would
be morally prohibited" (p. 3).
A very brief account of the main justifications considered,
and criticisms made, follows. Adversaries may try to defend
themselves by appealing to role prescriptions, including
permissions to harm, as if their mere existence justified
compliance. But the argument of chapter 3 is that roles have
no "independent moral force or ... grounding," and therefore cannot by themselves create moral obligations or permissions to do anything, much less anything wrong (p. 45).
Another defense, explored in chapter 4, is that a role which
has moral value imposes on its occupants moral obligations
"to defer to authority and comply with its rules," including
the common rule demanding neutrality, or the suspension of
personal judgment regarding the substantive merits of what
one is supposed to do (p. 60). Focusing on civil servants in a
liberal democratic setting, the author contends to the contrary that the suspension of political and moral judgments
regarding both the legitimacy and justice of authoritative
orders and policies is unacceptable since the morality of the
role and its obligations presuppose the legitimacy of both and
of any actions they may prescribe. Unreflective deference is
never justified; resistance and disobedience sometimes is.
Ensuing chapters canvass more interesting and challenging
defenses. Chapter 5 examines "the strategy of redescription"
or the claim that professional practices and roles "create new
ways of acting that can be judged only by the rules of the
practice" (p. 10). Rules governing the legal profession, for
instance, permit or require a variety of deceitful actions
which, however, are said to be misdescribed as deceitful;
actually, these actions are forms of zealous advocacy, and
they are legitimate, even obligatory, and cannot possibly be
moral wrongs. Acknowledging that this strategy tracks compelling accounts of how social practices can constitute action
descriptions (by, e.g., John R. Searle, Speech Acts, 1969), the
author nonetheless mounts a successful critique of it. The
essential point is that the strategy fails because it forgets that

institutionally constituted action descriptions (or redescriptions) are not exclusive or even privileged. Although it is true
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that "practice-defined descriptions can be judged only by the
terms set out by the practice," it is not true that a "practicedefined description is the only apt description" (p. 91). Thus,
while advocacy that involves misleading jurors or litigants is
on most accounts of legal practice truly good or competent
legal behavior, it is also deceitful behavior that needs to be,
if one cares about morality, justified. Moral scrutiny is not
blocked by redescription.
Another justification of harmful advocacy behavior, discussed in chapter 6, appeals to rules of the game. The defense
is that victims consent to, or as a matter of fairness must
accept, their treatment, much as players in a game of poker
must accept being targets of deceit. The key criticism of the
consent argument, made before by many writers (e.g., Sissela
Bok, Lying, 1978, and Dennis Thompson, Political Ethics and
Public Office, 1987), is that it asserts what is usually false:
Victims of adversary practices typically do not consent to
being mistreated. The argument from fair play reflects a
careful reworking of well-known literature asserting, and
questioning, the idea that persons may incur obligations to do
their part in a just scheme of cooperation by virtue of their
voluntary acceptance of benefits provided by others in that
scheme; the reworking holds that permissions to harm persons are justified if they accept or receive benefits in a just
scheme. The author's basic criticism of this argument is that,
at least in games of market competition, electoral politics,
and adversary law, consumers, citizens, and litigants are
typically neither advantaged by, nor do they voluntarily seek,
the games' benefits. "Business managers, public officials, and
lawyers may satisfy the conditions of fair play in their
deceptive or coercive dealings with one another," however, so
when they are deceived or coerced they "may have no
reasonable grounds for complaint" (p. 135).
In the longest and most technical chapter of the book,
chapter 7, the author explores defenses that reflect and
develop debates between consequentialists and Kantians
concerning the permissibility of intentional harm. Considerable effort is expended establishing a "conceptual case for
morally permissible violations of persons [on nonconsequentialist or Kantian grounds]" (p. 173). When refusing to violate
a person(s) is "self-defeating" because the person(s) will
suffer a more serious violation as a result, or when refusing is
"Pareto-inferior" because the person(s) will suffer anyway
and others will as well, a Kantian can ("with reluctance and
regret") justifiably violate the person(s), knowing that "reasonable" persons would, ex ante, consent to such treatment
(pp. 150, 165). After making this "conceptual" argument, the
author (with unintended irony) explains that it provides little
help for those who would defend most of the violations
adversary practices permit, since those practices typically
permit violations in circumstances that would not warrant
reasonable consent (although there are exceptions which the
author describes).
A final defense, or set of related defenses, is examined in
chapter 7, where the focus is on appeals to the social goods
secured by adversary institutions. One central criticism of
such appeals is that they characteristically exaggerate the
good results adversarial practices manage to produce. Another is that, even if some adversary practice does produce,
overall, good outcomes, this can at best justify institutional
permissions to harm but not, necessarily or automatically,
intentional harming. This is so for two reasons: First, particular cases of harming may not serve, they may even undermine or subvert, the ends which justify institutional permissions; second, even if the end and action of an adversary
agent in a particular case does serve good institutional
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purposes, intentionally harming others is not thereby justified. Good ends alone do not justify wrongful behavior.
This last point, of course, is a conclusion compelled by the
author's commitment to Kantianism; it is not, therefore,
wholly compelling. It would not persuade adversaries and
defenders of adversarial practices who knowingly embrace
some variety of moral consequentialism. Perhaps the central
weakness of this thoughtful book is the author's admission
that "if consequentialism is the correct moral theory, there is
no serious objection to an adversaryinstitution that produces
enough social good to outweigh ... the bad" (pp. 176-7). A
related weakness is his relative neglect of what might be
termed the phenomenology of role playing, which can explain
not only why adversaries and other role occupants may be
deaf to the demands of morality but also may make particular
moral judgments of which he cannot approve (see, e.g.,
Elizabeth Wolgast, Ethics of an Artificial Person, 1992).
Because I have focused on the central question addressed
by the author, I have neglected other chapters, and virtues, in
the book. Well-written, full of interesting cases and real and
imagined examples, Applbaum has drawn on much of his
previously published work to present an illuminating and
forceful critique of the arguments even good people in
professional and political life employ to justify the bad things
they do. For those interested in role morality and professional ethics, and who appreciate the style and results of
analytical moral and political philosophy done by the likes of
Nagel and Williams, Rawls and Dworkin, David Luban and
Dennis Thompson, Ethics for Adversaries is a must read.
Undergraduates would probably find it a hard go.
Why I Am Not a Secularist. By William E. Connolly. Minneapolis:- University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 210p. $29.95.
J. Donald Moon, Wesleyan University
This is the latest in a series of works in which Connolly has
been interrogating liberalism and its fellow travelers. Drawing on thinkers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and
Arendt, he has become one of liberalism's deepest and most
original critics today. And he is one of liberalism's most
valuable critics, in part because his own intellectual journey
begins with the experiences and preoccupations that led to
liberalism. This is evident in the title of this work, which
echoes and pays homage to Bertrand Russell's Why IAm Not
a Christian, a text that is very much in the tradition of the
secularism Connolly criticizes. It is also reflected in an
engaging biographical story that introduces the work, in
which Connolly describes how at a tender age he came to be
an atheist. But for Connolly, liberalism generally and secularism in particular do not provide viable accounts of these
experiences, or answers to these concerns.
Connolly conceives of "secularism" broadly, as the "wish to
provide an authoritative and self-sufficient public space
equipped to regulate and limit 'religious' disputes in public
life" (p. 5). Thus, secularism offers itself as the alternative to
the aggrandizing claims of religious truth to constitute the
moral and political center of society, an alternative that
becomes increasingly attractive as religious truth becomes
religious truths and competing visions lead to sectarian
conflict and violence. But in offering itself as the new center
for political life,_ secularism commits the same errors as its
traditional antagonists; although only one voice in the conversation, it sets itself up as the single, authoritative source to
adjudicate the differences among the others. In doing so it
fails to see its own limitations, and it creates its own forms of
dogmatism and intolerance, which, ironically, intensify the
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very forms of sectarian conflict that it was intended to
overcome.
Perhaps the greatest failing of secularism is its faith in
reason, or rather a certain conception of reason, one that is
blind to what Connolly calls "the visceral register of subjectivity and intersubjectivity" (p. 24). Drawing on various
sources, including recent brain research, Connolly insists that
thinking, remembering, and feeling cannot be reduced to or
modeled in terms of conscious, linguistically formulated
processes of thought. Ethical life, similarly, should not be
seen as enacting (or conforming our actions to) our beliefs
and ideals but includes practices that actively engage "the
visceral register of being" (p. 29). Public life cannot even in
principle be a matter of pure argument delivering authoritative judgments that all rational citizens must, on account of
their being rational, accept; rather, it is "always accompanied
and informed ... by visceral intensities of thinking, prejudgment, and sensibility" (p. 36). And that can be a good thing,
since it can lead to creativity and new forms of communication.
Not surprisingly, if there is a single figure with whom
Connolly is wrestling in these pages, it is Kant and his
contemporary descendants, notably Habermas and Rawls.
Much of the book consists of sustained engagements with
these figures, but it also addresses the political failings of a
secular vision of politics, including the war against drugs, the
use of the death penalty, and the debate over a right to
assisted suicide. Running throughout these analyses is what
we might call a therapeutic intention, an effort to wean us
away from the need for unity, for structure, for authoritative
centers and control. One of Connolly's favorite images is the
rhizome, literally a root-like structure consisting of a system
of interconnected roots, tubers, stems, and so on, with no
single or main stem to which they all feed. Culturally and
politically, Connolly calls on us to embrace what he calls
"deep pluralism," whereby we are connected to others in a
variety of ways, organizing ourselves into a complex array of
partially overlapping and intersecting associations, without
the need for a common center, whether it be the idealized
nation or the majesty of public reason or even the purity of
Arendtian politics. Against the secularist strategy of insulating political life from contested religious or metaphysical
views, we should embrace a politics of contestation in which
conflicting perspectives are admitted into political life. By
embracing these conflicts, rather than seeking to transcend
them, we are more likely to come to see the contestability of
our own moral sources and to discover new possibilitiesnew questions, new ways of engaging with others, new
alternatives. The strategy of secularism was an effort to avoid
conflict by retreating to an ever more rarified conception of
the public realm, and it has failed. Instead, we need a
"democratic ethos of engagement across multidimensional
lines of difference" that is "jointed to a sensibility that affirms
the ambiguity of being and the deep contingency of things"
(p. 186).
This is an attractive vision. Connolly is correct to argue that
the "reciprocal acknowledgment" by all that "no party has
shown its perspective to be undeniable" could widen the
scope for a "politics of forbearance, generosity, and selective
collaboration between interdependent partisans" (p. 187).
But one wonders how real a break this is from the politics of
secularism. In the first place, secularism also demands that
we reciprocally acknowledge the contestability of our own
positions, and it is precisely this demand that has been-and
is being-resisted by those who seek to embody their own
ideals in legislation and public policy. But more important, it

is hard to see how Connolly's "ethos of forbearance and

